AD NUMBER

ADB006699

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Proprietary Information; 06 JUN 1975. Other requests shall be referred to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.

AUTHORITY

ODDR&E ltr 20 Jan 1976

A Combined Arms Reorganization of U.S. Maneuver Battalions in CENTAG

Study Number 5 -Majors Donald J. Peters & Bruce A. Braun, and CPT George Webster
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

6 June 1975

Final Report - 6 June 1975

Prepared in partial fulfillment of graduation requirements for:

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)*

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE *(and Subtitle)* A Combined Arms Reorganization of U.S. Maneuver Battalions in CENTAG		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final Report 6 June 1975 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Study Nr 5		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student(s) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College during Academic Year 1974-75		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATSW-DD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		12. REPORT DATE 6 June 1975 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 74 pages
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS *(if different from Controlling Office)*		15. SECURITY CLASS. *(of this report)* Unclassified 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of this Report)*

Distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only; Proprietary Information; 6 June 1975. Other requests for this document must be referred to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)*

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

This study was prepared by a student(s) in partial fulfillment of graduation requirements for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

19. KEY WORDS *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

20. ABSTRACT *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

See Reverse Side

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)*

The purpose of the study was to determine the feasibility of reorganizing U.S. maneuver battalions, in Central Europe, into combined arms units to make them more effective in the defense.

The present situation in Central Europe mandates that significant improvement be realized in the integration of all U.S. maneuver battalion weapons systems, and the rejuvenation of combined arms operations and training be accomplished while maintaining present personnel ceilings.

Building on the assumptions that U.S. forces in CENTAG must win the first battle and that they have a unique defensive mission, new battalions based on the combined arms concept beginning at platoon level were developed.

A Dragoon battalion was designed to replace a mechanized battalion, and a Fusileer battalion was designed to replace an armor battalion. The Dragoon battalion is composed of two light Dragoon companies and a heavy Dragoon company. The light Dragoon company has two light Dragoon platoons, each having three APC's and two tanks, and one heavy Dragoon company has two APC's and three tanks. The heavy Dragoon company has two heavy Dragoon platoons and one light dragoon platoon. All companies in the Dragoon battalion have a weapons platoon composed or a mortar section with three 81mm mortars and an antitank section with two TOW's. The Fusileer battalion has three Fusileer companies, each with four Fusileer platoons. The Fusileer platoons are composed of three tanks and one APC.

The Dragoon and Fusileer battalions were analyzed according to their operational and fire power characteristics. This was then compared to present forces based on the assumption that there are 25 mechanized and 23 armor battalions in Central Europe, organized under TOE 7-45H(C5) and 17-35H(C5), respectively. The Dragoon and Fusileer battalions reflected significant advantages. They possess a remarkable fire power capability, particularly in antitank fires. Their congruent organization greatly enhances combat effectiveness, operational employment, and combined arms training. They maintain existing personnel ceilings while substantially increasing the number of fully-crewed tanks in Central Europe.

The study concludes that maneuver battalions in Central Europe should be reorganized into Dragoon and Fusileer battalions as proposed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

To determine the feasibility of reorganizing U. S. maneuver battalions, in Central Europe, into combined arms units to make them more effective in the defense.

Issues Addressed

1. Maximum integration of all weapons systems found within present maneuver battalions
2. Improvement of combined arms operations and training
3. Reorganization of maneuver battalions in Central Europe within their present personnel ceilings

Assumptions

1. U. S. forces must win the first battle.
2. Combined arms employment is a proven military principle.
3. The organization of the present maneuver battalions in Central Europe is based on TOE 7-45H(C5) for mechanized infantry battalions

and TOE 17-35H(C5) for armor battalions.

4. U. S. maneuver battalions in Central Europe maintain a singularly unique defensive combat mission to counter the Warsaw Pact threat.

5. The precedent for adoption of tailored U. S. forces in Central Europe has been set with the reorganization of the armored cavalry regiments.

6. U. S. forces in Central Europe are comprised of 25 mechanized battalions and 23 armor battalions.

Chapter 2

METHODOLOGY

General

In support of the DTAC NATO mini-study the Department of Tactics selected three officers with armor and infantry backgrounds to study the reorganization of U. S. maneuver forces in Central Europe. This group has had previous experience in Central Europe. The group resolved to formulate a combined arms organization at battalion and lower levels to determine if such an organization would provide a more effective defense for Central Europe. The study is based on research and original thought. Comparisons were based on 25 mechanized battalions and 23 armor battalions presently comprising the U. S. maneuver battalions in Central Europe. In order to establish viable parameters and allow for flexibility in methods of employment, it was further assumed that the proposed units initially would be employed in a defensive posture.[1] However, the proposed organization was not structured to eliminate the possibility of offensive action. On the contrary, it was organized to win the first battle and put the forces in position to exploit success.

To maximize the weapons system presently available in the maneuver battalions, integration of combined arms at the lowest level is necessary. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz supports this idea when he states, "What is really important is the acceptance of the principle that infantry combat vehicles and tanks are complementary and should always operate together."[2]

In Central Europe, emphasis is being placed on the combined arms concept.[3] However, the present H series TOEs are based on pure armor and mechanized battalions with emphasis on employing the units in a task organized configuration.[4] Extensive time and money is being expended to develop and test the proper configuration. Such a test was conducted by the Fourth Mechanized Division from May to August 1974. The forces of other allied nations illustrate similar reorganizational trends. The Germans have combined tanks with mechanized squads to form panzergrenadier units.[5] The trend has also been evident in the French mechanized regiment.[6] An effort directed toward the reorganization of the U. S. armored cavalry regiments in Central Europe is an indication that U. S. units are being officially tailored to the environment and mission required.[7] Many military analysts have long been recommending a permanent union of tank and mechanized forces.[8] Military journals publish many

articles by authors who set forth combined arms organization at many different levels.[9] These authors also stress the need for training of combat arms leaders and eliminating branch parochialism.[10]

In addition, emphasis is being directed to increasing the ratio of combat power to command headquarters and support units. This action is called for by the Nunn Amendment as well as by many Congressmen and military analysts.[11]

Approach

The research group used a five-phase approach in formulating the proposed combined arms organization. The initial requirement was to determine reasons for the reorganization of the units to be used in the defense. The second phase was the development of a combined arms organization which would utilize existing weapons and equipment presently available in Central Europe. In the third phase, an analysis was conducted to determine the operational characteristics of the proposed organization. Following this, an analysis was made which compared the fire power characteristics of the proposed combined arms organization with those of present U. S. mechanized and armor battalions and units of the Warsaw Pact. The final phase determined the overall advantages and disadvantages of the proposed combined arms force.

Format

The following format is used in presenting this study. The subsequent section sets forth a detailed description of the proposed combined arms organizations at battalion and lower levels. Units above battalion level remain unchanged. The study then addresses the fire power characteristics of the proposed units by making a comparative analysis with those of present mechanized, armor, and Warsaw Pact units. The next section presents an analysis of the reasons for the new organization and the conceptualized operation of the combined arms units. The final section highlights the facts which support the reorganization of U. S. maneuver battalions in Central Europe and presents the recommendation of the research group. The appendixes provide supportive data for the text of the study. The bibliography lists references which were used to direct, influence, and reinforce the thinking of members of the research group in their individual and collective consideration of the operation and organization of the proposed combined arms units.

Chapter 3

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Organization

Two organizations are presented as replacements for the mechanized and armor battalions presently in Central Europe. In this study these two organizations are referred to as the Dragoon Battalion and the Fusileer Battalion. (Appendix A and B) These battalions have been formed through the integration of combined arms teams at the lowest level.

Basically there are two types of platoons in the companies of the Dragoon Battalion: a light Dragoon platoon and a heavy Dragoon platoon. In each of the light platoons there are three mechanized squads and a tank section of two tanks. A heavy Dragoon platoon is composed of two mechanized squads and a tank section of three tanks. A closer examination of the light Dragoon platoon shows that each mechanized squad contains nine men. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant are assigned to ride in armored personnel carriers(APC). The heavy Dragoon platoon is organized by placing the platoon leader in one of the three tanks and assigning the platoon sergeant to an APC. The organization of

the nine-man mechanized squad remains the same as the light platoon. The two light Dragoon companies of the Dragoon Battalion each have one heavy Dragoon platoon. The other type company in a Dragoon Battalion is a heavy Dragoon company which has two heavy Dragoon platoons and one light Dragoon platoon.

The weapons platoons for both the heavy and light Dragoon companies are organized in the same manner. In the platoon headquarters, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant operate in a 1 1/4 ton truck. Organic indirect fire support for the company is provided by an 81mm mortar section consisting of three 81mm mortar squads. An antitank section consists of two antitank squads, each armed with the Tube launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided missile(TOW) mounted on an APC.

The organization of the company headquarters for the light and heavy Dragoon companies is the same. The company commander has an APC as his primary vehicle. He is given this vehicle, instead of a tank or command and reconnaissance vehicle(M114A1), to standardize the equipment in the company and to provide additional space in his vehicle for extra radios, liaison personnel, and attached augmentation. The headquarters section of the Dragoon company has the First Sergeant, Commo Chief, and Armorer assigned to an APC. A 1/4 ton truck is provided for the Executive Officer and a 2 1/2 ton truck

for the supply section. In the maintenance section of the Dragoon company an APC, 1 1/4 ton truck, and a 2 1/2 ton truck provide transportation for maintenance personnel which include both track and turret mechanics. Vehicle, Track Recovery(VTR) is the primary recovery vehicle and can be used for both APCs and tanks.

The organization of the three Fusileer companies in a Fusileer Battalion is identical. Each Fusileer company has four platoons. Each Fusileer platoon has a tank section composed of three tanks and a mechanized squad. The platoon leader commands from a tank and the platoon sergeant is assigned to an APC. The mechanized squad is organized exactly the same as the mechanized squad found in the Dragoon platoons.

The headquarters and headquarters company of the Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions are organized in the same manner except that APCs are the command and control vehicles for the Dragoon command group and tanks for the Fusileer command group. The battalion maintenance platoon has a balanced recovery and maintenance capability for both tanks and APCs.

In both the Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions, the combat support companies have similar organizations which include a company headquarters, maintenance section, and an armored vehicle launched bridge(AVLB) section. The companies also have a ground surveillance

section, a Redeye section, and a scout platoon. One exception exists; the Dragoon Battalion has an antitank platoon composed of six antitank(TOW) sections while the combat support company of the Fusileer Battalion replaces the antitank platoon with a heavy mortar platoon.

Personnel and Equipment

Tables 1 and 2 below reflect the manning levels and weapons densities used in this study.

Table 1

MANNING LEVELS

Unit	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted	Aggregate
Dragoon BN	38	1	773	812
Fusileer BN	39	1	591	631
Mechanized BN	39	1	828	868
Armor BN	36	1	537	574

In the above table, data for Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions was derived from Appendix A and B. Data for the mechanized and armor battalions was derived from U. S. Army Armor Reference Data, Volume 1, January 1974.

Table 2

WEAPONS DENSITY

Type Model	M60	M113	M114	TOW*	Dragon	LAW	4.2"	81mm	M60 mg	M20
Pure Mech BN	--	60	15	18	31	74	4	9	49	99
**Mech Task Force	17	47	14	16	22	56	4	6	33	76
Dragoon BN	22	41	9	18	27	66	--	9	23	86
***Soviet Mtz Inf TF	T62 10	BMP 30	-- --	Sagger 32	SPG-9 2	RPG7 28	120mm 6	-- --	PKSmg 27	-- --
Armor BN	54	9	9	--	4	--	4	--	1	18
****Armor Task Force	37	17	10	2	13	38	4	3	17	41
Fusileer BN	39	28	9	--	16	44	4	--	13	41
Soviet Tank BN	T62 31	BMP 2	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --	-- --

*Includes carrier

**Mech Task Force contains 2 Mech Companies and 1 Tank Company.

***Soviet Motorized Task Force contains 3 motorized companies and 1 Tank Company.

****Armor Task Force contains 2 Tank Companies and 1 Mech Company.

In the above table, data for mechanized and armor battalions was derived from U. S. Army Armor Reference Data, Volume 1, January 1974; data for Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions from Appendix A and B; data for Soviet motorized rifle and tank battalions from ST 23-3-1, undated and Aggressor Forces Fact Sheet, USACGSC, 31 May 1974.

Chapter 4

FIRE POWER ANALYSIS

General

In addressing the overall potential effectiveness of Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions, an analysis of the ability to generate fire power is of primary interest. As stated in FM 100-5(test), "The dominant factor of the modern battlefield is the range, accuracy, and target effect of modern weapons."[12] Fire power is the major ingredient of total combat power which is defined as "that total force, composed of destructive and disruptive forces, which a military unit can apply against an opponent".[13]

To aid in evaluating the potential effectiveness of Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions, numeric fire power values were developed and models constructed for maneuver battalions. Fire power scores were obtained from tables found in FM 105-5 and Combined Arms Combat Development Agency(CACDA), Manual, War Game (Jiffy) Methodology, July 1974. "These fire power scores are computed based on sustained rates of fire, effective width of burst, fragmentation area, and effectiveness of the weapon in comparison with other weapons."[14]

The individual fire power scores are not absolute and hold no particular credence when considered alone; however, they gain significance, and therefore usefulness, when compared to other scores within the same model. Likewise, any fire power groupings, or totals of a model, must be employed in a comparative mode to reflect relative discriminatory trends. Even then, care must be taken to ensure that the selective grouping developed and the comparisons made are realistic. For example when one tank is compared to one rifle, the resultant scores would be 32 for the tank and one for the rifle at less than 300 meters. This cannot logically be expanded to mean that 33 rifles would defeat one tank at the same range. On the other hand, if two organizations with similar weapons composition produced scores of 50 and 100 respectively, the magnitude of the difference in scores would reflect a numeric interpretation in their ability to generate total fire power.

The amassing of fire power scores is normally a preliminary step in the execution of a war game. In this study, the actual play of a war game model through the creation of critical incidents is not applicable since any outcomes would be a direct reflection of the specific tactics employed.

Models

The four basic force structure models analyzed were Dragoon, Fusileer, mechanized, and armor battalions. The mechanized and armor battalions were addressed in both pure and cross attached forms. When cross attached, each battalion was considered to have gained one pure maneuver company of the opposite arm while losing one organic maneuver company. For additional comparisons, fire power values were computed for models of a Soviet motorized rifle battalion and a tank battalion. Weapon density for these models is based on information derived from Special Text(ST) 23-3-1, undated and Aggressor Forces Fact Sheet, USACGSC, 31 May 1974.

In developing fire power scores for these models, the following assumptions were made:

1. The fire power scores within the headquarters and headquarters company of each battalion were not included in the computations since they were considered to have equal value.
2. Redeye weapons systems and caliber .45 pistols were not considered.
3. A basic load of two Light Antitank Weapons(LAW) per mechanized rifle squad and scout vehicle was used.
4. Within the antitank platoon of the combat support company, the fire power of each APC

was considered separately from the TOW weapons system.

5. Three Dragon weapons systems were substituted for two 90mm recoilless rifles reflected in the mechanized platoon TOE.

Methodology

Fire power values were computed at ranges of 300, 500, 700, and 1000 meters for each weapon system as well as in aggregate for each model. (Appendix C) A comparison of average total fire power values at each range is at Appendix D.

In addition, it was felt that further analysis could be made by selective comparisons. To accomplish this certain related fire power values were grouped for each type battalion model. For example, to gain insight into the differences of armored vehicle power, a category of armored vehicle values was developed. In this grouping, only maneuver company tanks(M60A1) and APCs(M113A1) were considered. To judge antitank capabilities the category of antitank values was instituted. This category considers only tanks, TOWs, Dragons, and LAWs. Finally, the category of small arms values, which includes only ground mounted machine guns(M60), grenade launchers(M203), and individual rifles(M16), was established to evaluate respective dismounted fire power. A comparison of grouped fire power values is at Appendix E.

Conclusions

An analysis of a Dragoon Battalion compared to a mechanized battalion and a mechanized task force indicated the following data. (Appendix F) The Dragoon unit is approximately equal in total fire power to a mechanized battalion and distinctively more effective than a mechanized task force. It has greater armored vehicle fire power than either alternative with dramatically more power than a mechanized battalion and is superior to both in antitank fire power. The Dragoon Battalion has less small arms fire power than a pure battalion, but about the same as a task force. In comparison to a Soviet motorized rifle battalion, the Dragoon Battalion is over one-third more powerful. In conclusion, a Dragoon Battalion offers equal or greater fire power in all areas, except small arms. Its most distinct advantages are in armored vehicle and antitank fire power.

An analysis of a Fusileer Battalion as compared to both an armor battalion and an armor task force reflects the following data. (Appendix F) The Fusileer Battalion has substantially greater total fire power than a battalion and approximately the same total fire power as a task force. It has less armored vehicle fire power than a battalion, but notably more than a task force and more antitank fire power than either.

The Fusileer Battalion has far greater small arms fire power than a battalion and about the same as a task force. Furthermore, it is almost two and one-half times as powerful as a Soviet tank battalion. In conclusion, a Fusileer Battalion offers equal or greater fire power than either of its present counterparts. It is clearly superior in armored vehicle fire power to a task force and has a distinct antitank fire power advantage over both.

Chapter 5

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

Combat Elements

In developing the Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions one problem addressed was to counter the Warsaw Pact threat.[15] The development of these battalions called for a reorganization that would improve unit comb .t power but not reduce operational effectiveness. In conjunction with this reorganization, a need was established for a combined arms team at the lowest supportable level. This need is created by unit dispersion and limited mutual support on today's extended battlefield. This indicated that the integration of tanks and mechanized forces to form a combined arms unit is best accomplished in the platoon. The organization of the combined arms platoon allows for the closest coordination of all weapons systems that are available at company level. This same type of coordination has been effective in armored cavalry platoons for many years.

The Dragoon Battalion was designed to optimize a defensive capability. Its basic organization and concepts follow those of a mechanized battalion with

major changes occurring at platoon level with the introduction of tanks. The battalion's organization contains a mix of weapons that improves the fire power and staying power of the units, but does not increase its size. The battalion provides its commander and maneuver company commanders with the capability to influence the battle through the use of the heavy Dragoon company or heavy Dragoon platoons.

The Fusileer Battalion is designed to enhance the flexibility of division and brigade commanders by providing an organic tank heavy force. The companies within this battalion are unique in that they are composed of four combined arms platoons. This structure provides more flexibility with a better organic combat arms mix than is possible in present combined arms forces.

The employment of the Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions will not cause major changes in present or proposed combined arms concepts, doctrine, and tactics. The missions of both armor and mechanized elements will remain the same. The close operational relationship between the members of these integrated teams will increase their effectiveness. The unit integrity of these combined arms elements will produce more effective teamwork and training, better qualified leaders, and improved battle results. The cross attachment of units as now practiced in Central Europe,makes effective

combined arms training within the platoon difficult to attain.

Combat Support

Combat support for both Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions will basically remain the same as in the standard maneuver battalions except in the areas of indirect fire and antitank support. Organic indirect fire support is required because of the flexibility and immediate response which it provides to the battlefield. The Dragoon Battalion has organic indirect fire support only at company level because of today's extended frontages. Duplication of mortars at battalion level is not required due to the relative ineffectiveness of high explosive ammunition against the Warsaw Pact threat. Still the mortars have the capability of providing illumination and smoke which is needed at company level. The Fusileer Battalion was organized with 4.2 inch mortars centralized at battalion level to provide the companies with an indirect fire support capability.

Organic to the combat support company of the Dragoon Battalion is an antitank platoon which provides additional antiarmor fires to the companies. A need for these fires was generated by the same extended defensive frontages and armor threat that guided the

organization of the antitank platoon within the present mechanized battalions. No antitank platoon was used within the combat support company of the Fusileer Battalion due to its preponderance of tanks.

These combined arms battalions, while operating in Central Europe, will require the AVLB section that is currently found in the tank battalion. The AVLB will improve the ability of these combined arms battalions to negotiate obstacles. The Redeye is the primary air defense weapons system in the Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions. This Redeye section will be organized in the same manner that is now found in the maneuver battalions. Other nonorganic combat support elements such as engineer, signal, and aviation units will support the combined arms battalions in the same manner as presently practiced in Central Europe.

Combat Service Support

Combat service support has always been a major problem area with the cross attachment of units. Mechanized battalions cannot provide required support to an attached tank company in the areas of recovery, maintenance, and resupply. Similar problems face the mechanized company attached to a tank battalion. The problems further increase when platoons are attached to companies. These problems are caused by a lack of organic combat service support within the company.

The organization of the Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions eliminates these existing combat service support problems. Through the design of identical maintenance elements, the battalions have the capability to provide required maintenance support for both tank and mechanized forces. Increasing the maintenance capabilities does not increase the requirements for maintenance personnel. Present categories of maintenance will remain valid. With reorganization, ammunition and POL resupply problems are eliminated. The logistical interface and doctrine between these and supporting organizations remain as presently established.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Conclusions

The reorganization of U. S. maneuver battalions in Central Europe into Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions resulted in significant advantages. The analysis of material presented in this study reflects the following major conclusions regarding this reorganization.

The proposed combined arms organizations possess a remarkable fire power capability. They accomplish this by maximizing the integration of all weapons systems found at battalion and lower levels. The Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions exceed or equal comparable units in total fire power. The salient point of this comparison is that their antitank fires are overwhelmingly superior to those of existing maneuver battalions. This is requisite for a successful defense against the Warsaw Pact threat.

Present methods of cross attachment between the maneuver battalions in Central Europe weaken unit integrity which detracts from the overall effectiveness of the task force. The configuration of the Dragoon and Fusileer

Battalions will form a more congruent unit, thus improving combat effectiveness. This organization gives the battalions a capability of accomplishing more diversified missions without task organizing. These permanent combined arms battalions offer stability and increased effectiveness by providing the opportunity for combined arms training on a daily basis.

The combined arms organization results in reduced personnel requirements. The substitution of Dragoon Battalions for mechanized battalions and Fusileer Battalions for armor battalions requires 89 fewer personnel. Another advantage of the reorganization becomes obvious when equipment totals are compared. These totals indicate that, while maintaining the personnel ceilings, further advantages will be derived from the exchange of 38 APCs for 205 fully crewed tanks. This exchange will substantially increase the total combat power of forces in Central Europe.

In conclusion, the reorganization of maneuver battalions in Central Europe into Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions is feasible and will produce a more effective defense.

Recommendation

It is recommended that maneuver battalions in Central Europe be reorganized into Dragoon and Fusileer Battalions as proposed in this study.

APPENDIX A

DRAGOON BATTALION ORGANIZATION

DRAGOON
O 38
WO 1
EM 773
AGG 812
HQ + HQ CO
O 15
WO 1
EM 151
LT DRAGOON CO
O 6
WO 0
EM 167
HVY DRAGOON CO
O 6
WO 0
EM 160
CBT SPT CO
O 5
WO 0
EM 128


HH
O WO EM AGG
38 1 773 812
BN HQ
O WO EM
6 0 1
HQ CO
O WO EM
9 1 150
CO HQ
O WO EM
2 0 6
BN HQ SEC
O WO EM
3 0 21
BN SPT PLT
O WO EM
1 0 53
BN COMM PLT
O WO EM
1 0 16
MAIN PLT
O WO EM
1 1 20
BN MED PLT
O WO EM
1 0 34

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND BATTALION HEADQUARTERS SECTION

TSEC/KY-8
2 AN/VRC-46



1 LTC (Bn Comdr) P
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47

1 MAJ (XO) P
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47

1 MAJ (S3) P
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 CPT (S4) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-12



1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-12



1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R

TSEC/KY-8
AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-47
2 AN/VRC-46

1 CPT (S3 Air) R
1 MSG (Op SGT) R
1 SFC (Asst Op SGT) R
1 SP4 (Clerk-Typist) R
1 SP4 (Sr Rdo Op) R
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R, GL

AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-47

1 CPT (S2) R
2 LT (LO) R
1 MSG (Intel SGT) R
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R, GL
1 PFC (Rdo Op) R

AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-47



1 CPT (S1) R
1 CSM (Comd SGT Major) R
1 SFC (Pers Staff NCO) R
1 SP4 (Clerk-Typist) R
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R, GL

1 SFC (AC Counselor Supv) R
1 SP6 (Legal Clerk) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VIC-1

1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R, GL

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

AN/VRC-46

1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 LT (XO) R
1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) (Dvr) R

COMMUNICATION PLATOON

AN/VRC-49
AN/GRA-39

1 CPT (Comm Off) R
1 SP4 (Sr Swbd Op) R
1 SP4 (Sr Wireman) R
2 PFC (Swbd Op) R
2 PFC (Wireman) (Dvr) R

TSEC/KY-8
AN/VRC-46
AN/GRA-39



1 SSG (Comm Chief) R
1 SP4 (Fld Rdo Mech) R
1 SP4 (Sr Msg Clerk) R
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R
2 PFC (Msg Clerk) R

TSEC/KW-7
AN/VSC-3

1 SGT (RATT Tm Chief) R
2 SP4 (RATT Op) R
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R

BATTALION MAINTENANCE PLATOON

1 CPT (Motor Off) R
1 MSG (Motor SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Welder) R
1 SP4 (Equip Maint Clk) R
1 SP4 (Turret Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

1 WO (Auto Maint Tech) R
1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Pwr Gen Op/Mech) R
5 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R



1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

AN/VRC-46

1 SGT (Recov SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

AN/VRC-46



1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

BATTALION SUPPORT PLATOON

PLATOON HQ

AN/VRC-46

1 LT (Plt Ldr) (Asst S4) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

SUPPLY SECTION

AN/PRC-77

1 SFC (Bn Sup SGT) R
2 SP4 (Sup SP) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) (Dvr) R
1 7.62-mm mg

MESS SECTION

HQ TEAM

1 SFC (Food Svc Steward) R
1 SP6 (1st Cook) R
2 SP5 (1st Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) (Dvr) R

COMPANY TEAMS

1 SFC (Food Svc Steward) R
1 SP6 (1st Cook) R
2 SP5 (1st Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) (Dvr) R

TRANSPORTATION SECTION



1 SSG (Ammo Chief) R
1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R



1 SP5 (Sr Hv Veh Dvr) R
1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R
1 PFC (Ammo Hdlr) R



1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R
1 PFC (Ammo Hdlr) R



1 SSG (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Lt Veh Dvr) R

1 SSG (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Lt Veh Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Lt Veh Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Lt Veh Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Lt Veh Dvr) R

Augmentation: 1 SP5 Sr Lt Veh Dvr.
6 SP4 Lt Veh Dvr.

BATTALION MEDICAL PLATOON

PLT HQ

AN/VRC-64

1 LT (Med Op Asst) P
1 SP4 (Med Aidman) (Dvr) R

AID STATION SEC

AN/VRC-64

1 SP6 (Sr Clinical SP) R
2 SP5 (Sr Med Aidman) R
1 SP4 (Med Aidman) (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-64

1 SFC (Plt SGT) R
1 SP5 (Clinical SP) R
1 SP4 (Amb Dvr) P

EVACUATION SEC

AN/VRC-64

1 SGT (Sec SGT) R
1 SP4 (Amb Dvr) R
3 SP4 (Med Aidman) R

AN/VRC-64

1 SP4 (Amb Dvr) P
1 SP4 (Med Aidman) R

AIDMAN SEC

15 SP5 (Co Aidman) P

* Mounts TOE cal .50 mg on ring mount.

A,B


LIGHT
O O
6 0
EM AGG
167 173
CO HQ
O EM
2 20
LT PLT
O EM
1 40
HVY PLT
O EM
1 33
WPN PLT
O EM
1 34
PLT HQ
O EM
1 2
DRAGOON SQD
O EM
0 10
FUSILEER SEC
O EM
0 4
TANK # 1
TANK # 2
PLT HQ
O EM
1 2
MORT HQ SEC
O EM
0 9
EI-MM SQD
O EM
0 5
HQ SEC
O EM
2 7
MAINT SEC
O EM
0 11
PLT HQ
O EM
1 2
(O IS IN TK#1)
DRAGOON SQD
O EM
0 10
FUSILEER SEC
O EM
1 3
TK # 1
AT SQD
O EM
0 4

LIGHT DRAGOON COMPANY
2 PER BN

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS SECTION

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39



1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
2 AN/PRC-77



1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SGT (Comm Chief) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) R, GL
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39

1 LT (XO) (Mtr Off) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R, GL

1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) R

MAINTENANCE SECTION

AN/VRC-64

1 SFC (Motor SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP4 (Track Veh Mech)
(Pers Carr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

1 SP5 (Sr Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP4 (Equip Maint Clk) (Dvr) R
1 SP4 (Fld Rdo Mech) R

2 SP4 (Gen Veh Rpmn) R
1 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) (Dvr) R

LIGHT DRAGON PLATOON

(2 PER CO)



1 LT (PLT LDR)R	1 SFC (PLT SGT)R	
1 SSG (SQD LDR)R	1 SSG (SQD LDR)R	1 SSG (SQD LDR)R
2 SGT (TM LDR)R	2 SGT (TM LDR)R	2 SGT (TM LDR)R
1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR) (RTO)R	1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR) (RTO)R	1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR) (RTO)R
1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P	1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P	1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P
2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R	2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R	2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R
1 PFC (MG GNR)P	1 PFC (MG GNR)P	1 PFC (MG GNR)P
2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL	2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R;GL	2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL



HEAVY DRAGON PLATOON

(1 PER CO)

AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-12

1 LT (Plt Ldr) P
1 SGT (Asst Tk Comdr) (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-47
AN/VRC-64

AN/VRC-64

1	SFC	(PLT SGT)R			
1	SSG	(SQD LDR)R	1	SSG	(SQD LDR) R
2	SGT	(TM LDR)R	2	SGT	(TM LDR)R
1	SP4	(PER CARR DR) (RTO)R	1	SP4	(PER CARR DR) (RTO)R
1	SP4	(DRAGON GNR)P	1	SP4	(DRAGON GNR)P
2	PFC	(RIFLEMAN)R	2	PFC	(RIFLEMAN)R
1	SP4	(MG GNR)P	1	SP4	(MG GNR)P
2	SP4	(GRENADIER)R,GL	2	SP4	(GRENADIER)R,GL

WEAPONS PLATOON

PLT HQ

AN/VRC-47

1 LT (Plt Ldr) R
1 SFC (Plt SGT) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

81-MM MORTAR SECTION

SEC HQ

AN/GRC-160
AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 PFC (RTO) (Dvr) R

AN/GRC-160
AN/PRC-77
AN/VRC-47

3 SGT (FO) R
2 SP5 (FD Cmpt) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R, GL
1 PFC (Rdo Tel Op) R

(3) MORTAR SQUAD

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Gunner) P
1 SP4 (Mortar Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Asst Gnr) P
1 PFC (Ammo Bearer) R, GL
1 81-mm Mortar

AT SECTION (TOW)

ANTITANK SQUAD

AN/GRC-160

1 SSG SEC LDR (R)
1 SP4 GNR (P)
1 SP4 PERS CARR DVR (R)
1 PFC ASST GNR (P)

ANTITANK SQUAD

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT SQD LDR (R)
1 SP4 GNR (P)
1 SP4 PERS CARR DVR (R)
1 PFC ASST GNR (P)

C


HEAVY
O W EM ASG
6 0 160 166
CO HQ
O EM
2 20
LT PLT
O EM
1 40
HVY PLT
O EM
1 33
WPN PLT
O EM
1 34
PLT HQ
O EM
1 2
DRAGOON SQD
O EM
0 10
FUSILEER SEC
O EM
0 4
TANK #1
TANK #2
PLT HQ
O EM
1 2
HQ SEC
O EM
2 7
MAINT SEC
O EM
0 11
MORT HQ SEC
O EM
0 9
81-MM SQD
O EM
0 5
PLT HQ
O EM
1 2
(LT IS LOCATED IN TK #1)
DRAGOON SQD
O EM
0 10
FUSILEER SEC
O EM
1 3
TK #1
TK #2 EM 4
TK #3 EM 4
AT SQD
O EM
0 4

HEAVY DRAGOON COMPANY (1) PER BN

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS SECTION

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39

1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
2 AN/PRC-77



1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SGT (Comm Chief) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) R, GL
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39

1 LT (XO) (Mtr Off) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R, GL

1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) R

MAINTENANCE SECTION

AN/VRC-64

1 SFC (Motor SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP4 (Track Veh Mech)
(Pers Carr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

1 SP5 (Sr Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP4 (Equip Maint Clk) (Dvr) R
1 SP4 (Fld Rdo Mech) R

2 SP4 (Gen Veh Rpmn) R
1 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) (Dvr) R

HEAVY DRAGOON PLATOON

(2 PER CO)

AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-12

1 LT (Plt Ldr) P
1 SGT (Asst Tk Comdr) (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-47
AN/VRC 64

1 SFC (PLT SGT)R
1 SSG (SQD LDR)R
2 SGT (TM LDR)R
1 SP4 (PER CARR DR) (RTO)R
1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P
2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R
1 SP4 (MG GNR)P
2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (SQD LDR) R
2 SGT (TM LDR)R
1 SP4 (PER CARR DR) (RTO)R
1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P
2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R
1 SP4 (MG GNR)P
2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL

LIGHT DRAGOON PLATOON

(1 PER CO)



1 LT (PLT LDR)R	1 SFC (PLT SGT)R	
1 SSG (SQD LDR)R	1 SSG (SQD LDR)R	1 SSG (SQD LDR)R
2 SGT (TM LDR)R	2 SGT (TM LDR)R	2 SGT (TM LDR)R
1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR) (RTO)R	1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR) (RTO)R	1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR) (RTO)R
1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P	1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P	1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P
2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R	2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R	2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R
1 PFC (MG GNR)P	1 PFC (MG GNR)P	1 PFC (MG GNR)P
2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL	2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL	2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL



WEAPONS PLATOON

PLT HQ

AN/VRC-47

1 LT (Plt Ldr) R
1 SFC (Plt SGT) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

81-MM MORTAR SECTION

SEC HQ

AN/GRC-160
AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 PFC (RTO) (Dvr) R

AN/GRC-160
AN/PRC-77
AN/VRC-47



3 SGT (FO) R
2 SP5 (FD Cmpt) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R, GL
1 PFC (Rdo Tel Op) R

(3) MORTAR SQUAD

AN/GRC-160



1 SGT (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Gunner) P
1 SP4 (Mortar Corr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Asst Gnr) P
1 PFC (Ammo Bearer) R, GL
1 81-mm Mortar

AT SECTION (TOW)

ANTITANK SQUAD

AN/GRC-160

1 SSG SEC LDR (R)
1 SP4 GNR (P)
1 SP4 PERS CARR DVR (R)
1 PFC ASST GNR (P)

ANTITANK SQUAD

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT SQD LDR (R)
1 SP4 GNR (P)
1 SP4 PERS CARR DVR (R)
1 PFC ASST GNR (P)


SPT
0 WO
5 0
EM AGG
128 133
CO HQ
0 EM
2 9
MAINT SEC
0 EM
0 13
GND SURV SEC
0 EM
0 12
AVLB SEC
0 EM
0 4
REDEYE SEC
0 EM
1 11
SCOUT PLT
0 EM
1 21
AT PLT
0 EM
1 50

COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

AN/PRC-77
AN/VRC-47



1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R, GL

AN/VRC-47



1 LT (XO) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) (Dvr) R

AN/PRC-77
AN/GRC-160



1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SGT (Comm SGT) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R
1 SP4 (Sr Fld S-bd Op) R, GL

MAINTENANCE SECTION

AN/VRC-46



1 SFC (Mtr SGT) R
1 SP4 (Equip Maint Clk) R
1 SP4 (Fld Equ Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
3 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Surv Rdr Mech) R
1 SP4 (Powerman) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

Augmentation: 1 SP4 PLL Clk

ARMD VEH LOH BPG SECTION

AN/VRC-64

*1 SSG SEC CHIEF (R)
1 SP4 ARMD VEH DVR (R)

AN/VRC-64

1 SGT BPG SEC SGT (R)
1 SP4 ARMD VEH DVR (R)

BATTALION GROUND SURVEILLANCE SEC

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SSG (Sec SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Team Ldr) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Team Ldr) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Team Ldr) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Surv Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

REDEYE SECTION

SEC HQ

AN/VRC-47

(2) MOUNTED TM

AN/GRC-160

(3) DISMOUNTED TM

AN/PRC-77

* Mounts TOE cal .50 mg on ring mount.

BATTALION SCOUT PLATOON

PLATOON HQ

AN/VRC-12



1 LT (Plt Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/VRC-47

1 SFC (PSG) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

FIRST SCOUT SECTION

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

SECOND SCOUT SECTION

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 PFC (Set Obsr) R, GL

BATTALION ANTITANK PLATOON

PLATOON HQ

2 AN/VRC-47

1 LT (Plt Ldr) R
1 SFC (Plr SGT) R
2 PFC (RTO) (Dvr) R

AT SEC (6)

AN/GRC-160

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Gunner) P
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R, GL
1 PFC (Asst Gnr) P

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Gunner) P
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R, GL
1 PFC (Asst Gnr) P

APPENDIX B

FUSILEER BATTALION ORGANIZATION

FUSILEER
O WO EM ASG
34 1 591 631
FUSILEER CO
O WO EM
6 O 108
HQ & HQ CO
O WO EM
16 1 157
CET SPT CO
O WO EM
5 O 110



BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND BATTALION HEADQUARTERS SECTION

TSEC KY-8
2 AN/VRC-46
AN/GRA-39

1 LTC (Bn Comdr) P
1 PFC (Rad Op) (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39

1 MAJ (XO) P
1 PFC (Dvr) R

2 AN/VRC-46

1 MAJ (S3) P
1 SP4 (Op Asst) (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47

1 CPT (S4) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VIC-1
AN/VRC-46

1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P



2 CPT (LO) R
1 SFC (Asst Op SGT) R
1 SP4 (Clk-Typist) (Dvr) R

TSEC-KY-8
2 AN/VRC-46
AN/GRA-39

1 CPT (S3 Air) R
1 MSG (Op SGT) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P
1 SP4 (Sr Rdo Op) R

AN/VRC-47

1 CPT (S2) R
1 MSG (Intel SGT) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P

AN/VRC-47

1 CPT (S1) R
1 CSM (Comd Sergeant Major) R
1 SFC (Pers Staff NCO) R
1 SFC (AC Counselor Supv) R
1 SP6 (Legal Clk) R
1 SP4 (Clk-Typist) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P

Notes. (Bn HQ Sec.)
1. Bn Comm Off and Motor Off are included in Bn HQ but are shown with respective sections or platoons.

HEADQUARTERS TANK SECTION

AN/VRC-12
AN/GRA-39

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-12
AN/GRA-39

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-12

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

AN/VRC-46

1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-64

1 LT (XO) R
1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R



1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) (Dvr) R

COMPANY MAINTENANCE SECTION

AN/VRC-64

1 SFC (Motor SGT) R
1 SP4 (Equip Records Clk) (Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
2 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr)(Dvr) R

2 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Wrecker Op) R

BATTALION COMMUNICATION PLATOON

AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-49

1 CPT (Comm Off) R
1 SP4 (Fld Rdo Mech) (Dvr) R

Note. Comm Off is asgd to Bn HQ.

1 PFC (Msgr) (Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Sr Msg Clk) R
1 PFC (Msg Clk) (Dvr) R
1 PFC (Msg Clk) R

TSEC/KW-7
AN/GRA-39
AN/VRC-46
AN/VSC-3

1 SSG (Comm Chief) R
1 SGT (RATT Tm Chief) R
1 SP4 (Radar Mech) R
2 SP4 (RATT Op) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) P

BATTALION MAINTENANCE PLATOON

AN/VRC-46

1 CPT (Motor Off) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R



1 WO (Auto Maint Tech) R
1 MSG (Mtr SGT) R
1 SP4 (PLL Clk) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
3 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
2 SP4 (Powerman) R
1 PFC (Powerman Appr) (Dvr) R

3 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 PFC (Powerman Appr) (Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP5 (Sr Welder) R
1 SP4 (Welder) (Dvr) R
2 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

AN/VRC-46



1 SSG (Recov SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

AN/VRC-46

1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

Note. Maint Officer commands Maint Plt, is assigned to Bn HQ.

BATTALION SUPPORT PLATOON

PLATOON HQ

AN/VRC-47

1 LT (Plt Ldr) (Asst S4) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

SUPPLY SECTION

1 SFC (Sup SGT) R
1 SP4 (Sup SP) (Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) R



1 SP4 (Sup SP) (Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) R

MESS SECTION

HQ CO TEAM

1 SFC (Food Svc Steward) R
1 SP6 (1st Cook) R
2 SP5 (1st Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) (Dvr) R

COMPANY TEAMS

1 SFC (Food Svc Steward) R
1 SP6 (1st Cook) R
2 SP5 (1st Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) R
1 SP4 (Cook) (Dvr) R

TRANSPORTATION SECTION



1 LT (Sec Comdr) R
1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Hv Veh Dvr) R

1 SFC (Truckmaster) R
1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Ammo SP) R
1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R

1 SP4 (Hv Veh Dvr) R
2 PFC (Ammo Hldr) R

Augmentation: 6 PFC Asst Hv Veh Dvr.

BATTALION MEDICAL PLATOON

PLT HQ

1 LT (Med Plt Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Med Aidman) (Dvr) R

AID STATION SECTION

AN/VRC-64

1 WO (Physicians Asst) P
1 SFC (Sec SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Med Aidman) R
1 SP4 (Amb Dvr) P

1 SFC (Plt SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Med Aidman) R
1 SP4 (Med Aidman) R
1 SP4 (Med Aidman) (Dvr) R

* Mounts TOE cal .50 mg on ring mount

EVACUATION SECTION

1 SP4 (Med Aidman) P
1 SP4 (Amb Dvr) P

AN/VRC-64

1 SP4 (Medical Aidman) P
1 SP4 (Amb Dvr) P

Note. 1 SGT sec SGT rides as desired.

AIDMAN SECTION

3 SP5 (Co Aidman) P

FUSILEER COMPANY (3) PER BN

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS SECTION

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39

1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
2 AN/PRC-77



1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SGT (Comm Chief) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) R, GL
1 SP4 (Pers Corr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
AN/GRA-39

1 LT (XO) (Mtr Off) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R, GL

1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 PFC (Sup Clk) R

MAINTENANCE SECTION

AN/VRC-64

1 SFC (Motor SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP4 (Track Veh Mech)
(Pers Corr Dvr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

1 SP5 (Sr Tk Turret Mech) R
1 SP4 (Equip Maint Clk) (Dvr) R
1 SP4 (Fld Rdo Mech) R

2 SP4 (Gen Veh Rpmn) R
1 SP4 (Tk Turret Mech) (Dvr) R

MUSKET PLATOON (4 ea)

TANK SECTION

AN/VRC-12
AN/GRA-39

1 LT (Plt Ldr) P
1 SGT (Asst Tk Comdr) (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

AN/VRC-64

1 SSG (Tk Comdr) P
1 SP5 (Gnr) P
1 SP5 (Tk Dvr) P, S
1 PFC (Loader) P, S

(ONE RIFLE SQUAD PER PLATOON)

AN/VRC-47
AN/PRC-77



1 SFC (PLT SGT)R
1 SSG (SQD LDR)R
2 SGT (TM LDR)R
1 SP4 (PERS CARR DR)
(RTO)R
1 SP4 (DRAGON GNR)P
2 PFC (RIFLEMAN)R
1 SP4 (MG GNR)P
2 SP4 (GRENADIER)R,GL



COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

AN/PRC-77
AN/VRC-47

1 CPT (Co Comdr) P
1 SP4 (Fwd Corr Dvr) R, GL

AN/VRC-47

1 LT (XO) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

1 SSG (Sup SGT) R
1 SP4 (Armorer) (Dvr) R

AN/PRC-77
AN/GRC-160

1 1SG (First Sergeant) R
1 SGT (Comm SGT) R
1 SP5 (Unit Clerk) R
1 SP4 (Fwd Corr Dvr) R
1 SP4 (Sr Fld Swbd Op) R, GL

MAINTENANCE SECTION

AN/VRC-46

1 SFC (Mtr SGT) R
1 SP4 (Equip Maint Clk) R
1 SP4 (Fld Rdo Mech) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

1 SP5 (Sr Track Veh Mech) R
3 SP4 (Track Veh Mech) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Survl Rdr Mech) R
1 SP4 (Powerman) R
1 PFC (Track Veh Mech Hlpr) (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-46

*1 SP5 (Sr Recov Veh Op) P, S
1 SP4 (Recov Veh Op) P, S

Augmentation: 1 SP4 FLL CE

ARMD VEH LDR FDG SECTION

AN/VRC-64

*1 SSG SEC CHIEF (R)
1 SP4 ARMD VEH DVR (R)

AN/VRC-64

1 SGT BRG SEC SGT (R)
1 SP4 ARMD VEH DVR (R)

BATTALION GROUND SURVEILLANCE SEC

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SSG (Sec SGT) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Team Ldr) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Team Ldr) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

AN/PPS-5
AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Team Ldr) R
1 SP5 (Sr Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) R
1 SP4 (Gnd Survl Rdr Crmn) (Dvr) R

REDEYE SECTION

SEC HQ

AN/VRC-47

(2) MOUNTED TM

AN/GRC-160

(3) DISMOUNTED TM

AN/PRC-77

* Mount TOE cal .50 mg on ring mount.

BATTALION SCOUT PLATOON

PLATOON HQ

AN/VRC-12

1 LT (Plt Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/VRC-47

1 SFC (PSG) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

Augmentation: 1 PFC RTO

FIRST SCOUT SECTION

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

SECOND SCOUT SECTION

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sec Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/VRC-46

1 SSG (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Asst Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Sct Obsr) R

BATTALION HEAVY MORTAR PLATOON

PLATOON HEADQUARTERS

AN/VRC-47

1 LT (Plt Ldr) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/PRC-77
AN/VRC-46

1 SGT (FO) R
1 PFC (Dvr) R

AN/VRC-47
AN/VRC-64

1 SFC (PSG) R
1 SSG (FD Chief) R
2 SP5 (FD Computer) R
1 SP4 (Pers Carr Dvr) R, GL

(4) MORTAR SQUAD

AN/GRC-160

1 SGT (Sqd Ldr) R
1 SP4 (Gnr) P
1 SP4 (Mort Carr Dvr) R
1 PFC (Ammo Bearer) R
1 PFC (Asst Gnr) P

APPENDIX C

FIRE POWER COMPUTATIONS

FIRE POWER COMPUTATIONS

DRAGOON BATTALION MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
M60A1	22	32	704	32	704	32	704	30	660
M113A1	54	10	540	10	540	10	540	10	540
M114A1	9	15	135	15	135	15	135	15	135
TOW	18	60	1080	60	1080	60	1080	60	1080
DRAGON	27	50	1350	50	1350	50	1350	50	1350
LAW	66	5	330	-	-	-	-	-	-
81mm	9	12	108	12	108	12	108	12	108
M60	23	6	138	6	138	6	138	6	138
M16	329	1	329	.5	164	-	-	-	-
M203	86	5	430	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS			5144		4219		4055		4011

AVERAGE: 4357.25

FUSILEER BATTALION MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
M60A1	36	32	1152	32	1152	32	1152	30	1080
M113A1	22	10	220	10	220	10	220	10	220
M114A1	9	15	135	15	135	15	135	15	135
TOW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DRAGON	16	50	800	50	800	50	800	50	800
LAW	44	5	220	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.2"	4	15	60	15	60	15	60	15	60
M60	13	6	78	6	78	6	78	6	78
M16	180	1	180	.5	90	-	-	-	-
M203	41	5	205	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS			3050		2445		2355		2283

AVERAGE: 2533.25

FIRE POWER COMPUTATIONS

US MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
M60A1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
M113	55	10	550	10	550	10	550	10	550
M114	12	15	180	15	180	15	180	15	180
TOW	18	60	1080	60	1080	60	1080	60	1080
DRAGON	31	50	1550	50	1550	50	1550	50	1550
LAW	74	5	370	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.2"	4	15	60	15	60	15	60	15	60
81mm	9	12	108	12	108	12	108	12	108
M60mg	49	6	294	6	294	6	294	6	294
M203	99	5	495	-	-	-	-	-	-
M16	534	1	534	.5	267	-	-	-	-

TOTALS.....5221.....4089.....3822.....3822

AVERAGE: 4239

US MECHANIZED TASK FORCE MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
M60A1	17	32	544	32	544	32	544	30	510
M113	42	10	420	10	420	10	420	10	420
M114	11	15	165	15	165	15	165	15	165
TOW	16	60	960	60	960	60	960	60	960
DRAGON	22	50	1100	50	1100	50	1100	50	1100
LAW	56	5	280	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.2"	4	15	60	15	60	15	60	15	60
81mm	6	12	72	12	72	12	72	12	72
M60mg	33	6	198	6	198	6	198	6	198
M203	76	5	380	-	-	-	-	-	-
M16	375	1	375	.5	187	-	-	-	-

TOTALS.....4554.....3706.....3519.....3485

AVERAGE: 3816

FIRE POWER COMPUTATIONS

US ARMOR BATTALION MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
M60A1	51	32	1632	32	1632	32	1632	30	1530
M113	4	10	40	10	40	10	40	10	40
M114A1	9	15	135	15	135	15	135	15	135
TOW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DRAGON	4	50	200	50	200	50	200	50	200
LAW	20	5	100	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.2"	4	15	60	15	60	15	60	15	60
M60	1	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
M203	18	5	90	-	-	-	-	-	-
M16	30	1	30	.5	15	-	-	-	-
TOTALS			2293		2198		2183		2081

AVERAGE: 2188.75

US TANK TASK FORCE MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
M60A1	34	32	1088	32	1088	32	1088	30	1020
M113	17	10	170	10	170	10	170	10	170
M114	10	15	150	15	150	15	150	15	150
TOW	2	60	120	60	120	60	120	60	120
DRAG	13	50	650	50	650	50	650	50	650
LAW	38	5	190	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.2"	4	15	60	15	60	15	60	15	60
81mm	3	12	36	12	36	12	36	12	36
M60mg	17	6	102	6	102	6	102	6	102
M203	41	5	205	-	-	-	-	-	-
M16	189	1	189	.5	94	-	-	-	-
TOTALS			2960		2470		2376		2308

AVERAGE: 2526

FIRE POWER COMPUTATIONS

SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE TASK FORCE MODEL*

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
T62	10	34	340	34	340	34	340	32	320
BMP	30	22	660	22	660	22	660	22	660
SAGGER	32	55	1650	55	1650	55	1650	55	1650
SPG-9	2	30	60	30	60	30	60	30	60
RPG-7	28	5	140	-	-	-	-	-	-
120mm	6	20	180	20	180	20	180	20	180
MG PKS	27	6	162	6	162	6	162	6	162
AKM	289	1	289	.5	144	-	-	-	-
TOTALS.....			3481		3196		3052		3032

AVERAGE: 3190

SOVIET TANK BATTALION MODEL

TYPE WPN	NO WPNS	300m FP/WPN	300m TOT	500m FP/WPN	500m TOT	700m FP/WPN	700m TOT	1000m FP/WPN	1000m TOT
T62	31	34	1054	34	1054	34	1054	32	992
BMP	2	22	44	22	44	22	44	22	44
TOTALS.....			1098		1098		1098		1036

AVERAGE: 1083

*CONSISTS OF A MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION AND AN ATTACHED TANK COMPANY.

APPENDIX D

TOTAL FIRE POWER COMPARISON


TOTAL FIRE POWER COMPARISON
MECHNIZED BN MODEL
DRAGOON BN MODEL
MECHNIZED TASK FORCE MODEL
FUSILEER BN MODEL
TANK TASK FORCE MODEL
TANK BN MODEL
FIRE POWER SCORES
5000
4000
3000
2000
RANGE
300 M
400 M
500 M
700 M
1000 M

APPENDIX E

GROUPED FIRE POWER COMPARISON

GROUPED FIRE POWER COMPARISON



APPENDIX F

FIRE POWER COMPARISON SUMMARY

FIRE POWER COMPARISON SUMMARY

TYPE MODEL	AVERAGE TOTAL FIRE POWER	ARMORED VEHICLE FIRE POWER	ANTITANK FIRE POWER	SMALL ARMS FIRE POWER
MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION	4239	550	2722	1323
MECHANIZED TASK FORCE	3816	955	2665	953
DRAGOON BATTALION	4357	1233	3205	897
SOVIET MOTORIZED TASK FORCE	3190	1000	2080	591
ARMOR BATTALION	2189	1646	1831	126
ARMOR TASK FORCE	2526	1071	1888	486
FUSILEER BATTALION	2533	1354	1989	463
SOVIET TANK BATTALION	1038	1038	1038	-

% DRAGOON BATTALION SURPASSES COMPARATIVE FORCE MODELS

MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION	3%	124%	18%	-32%
MECHANIZED TASK FORCE	14%	29%	20%	- 6%
SOVIET MOTORIZED TASK FORCE	37%	268%	54%	52%

% FUSILEER BATTALION SURPASSES COMPARATIVE FORCE MODELS

ARMOR BATTALION	16%	-18%	9%	267%
ARMOR TASK FORCE	0%	26%	5%	- 5%
SOVIET TANK BATTALION	144%	30%	92%	-

NOTES

NOTES

1. R. W. Komer, "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Would," Military Review, (August, 1974), pp. 60-62.

2. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, "Infantry's Combat Vehicles," ARMOR, (September-October, 1974), p. 20.

3. Michael S. Davidson, GEN, USA, "Combined Arms Training in USAREUR and 7 A," Disposition Form from DTAC, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, (21 January 1975), p. 1.

4. U. S. Army Combat Arms Training Board, The Tank/ Mechanized Infantry Team, TC 71-4-2, (October, 1974), p. 5.

5. William E. DePuy, GEN, USA, Presentation at U. S. Army Infantry School, 13 February 1975.

6. Jean G. Salvan, LTC, French Army, "French Infantry," INFANTRY, (September-October, 1974), p. 37.

7. Paul F. Nagengast Jr., CPT, USA, and Mack B. Gardner, 1LT, USA, "3 for 5," ARMOR, (January-February, 1974), pp. 35-39.

8. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, "Tanks in Tomorrow's Armies," Military Review, (February, 1974), pp. 20-24.

9. Bruce T. Caine, CPT, USA, "Dragoons and Hussars," ARMOR, (November-December, 1974), pp. 24-30.

10. Clive Milner, MAJ, Canada, "The Combat Team Commander," ARMOR, (May-June, 1974), p. 29.

11. George E. Dials, CPT, USA, and Dick Larsen, MSG, USAF, "NATO: Two Views," ARMY, (February, 1975), pp. 12-14.

12. U. S. Department of the Army, "Operations," FM 100-5 (Test), (2 December 1974), pp. 1-3.

13. U. S. Department of the Army, "Maneuver Control," FM 105-5, 31 December 1973, p. 6-1.

14. Ibid., p. 6-4.

15. Dials and Larsen, op. cit., pp. 11-19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Military Publications

U. S. Army Armor and Infantry Schools, "The Tank/Mechanized Infantry Team," TC 71-4-2, (U.S. Army Combat Army Training Board, October, 1974).

U. S. Army Armor School, "US Army Armor Reference Data," ST 17-1-1 Vol. 1 and 2, (Ft. Knox, Kentucky, US Army Armor School, January, 1974).

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Aggressor Forces Fact Sheet," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, n.d.).

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, "France and Its Defense Organization," RB550-1, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1974).

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Selected Reading in Tactics," RB100-2, Vol I, C1, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, U. S. Government Printing Office, June, 1973).

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, "War Gaming," ACN R21963 and R3656, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, U. S. Government Printing Office, July, 1974).

U. S. Army Infantry School, "Antiarmor Tactics and Techniques for Mechanized Infantry," ST 23-3-1, (Ft. Benning, Georgia, U. S. Government Printing Office, September, 1974).

U. S. Army Infantry School, "The Mechanized Infantry Platoon," TC 7-4 Test Edition, (Ft. Benning, Georgia, U. S. Government Printing Office, n.d.).

U. S. Army Infantry School, "U. S. Army Infantry Reference Data," ST 7-157, (Ft. Benning, Georgia, U. S. Army Infantry School, FY 72).

U. S. Department of the Army, Armor Operations, FM 17-1, (Washington: Government Printing Office, October, 1966).

U. S. Department of the Army, Field Artillery Tactics and Operations, FM 6-20, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973).

U. S. Department of Army, "Fundamentals of Mechanized Infantry," Headquarters V Corps, 12 October 1973.

U. S. Department of the Army, "Maneuver Control," FM 105-5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, December, 1973).

U. S. Department of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5(TEST), (Washington: A. P. Hill, December, 1974).

U. S. Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques and Concepts of Antiarmor Warfare, FM 23-3, (Washington: Government Printing Office, August, 1972).

U. S. Department of the Army, Tank Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion, FM 17-15, (Washington: Government Printing Office, November, 1969).

U. S. Department of the Army, The Infantry Battalions, FM 7-20, (Washington: Government Printing Office, December, 1969).

U. S. Department of the Army, The Rifle Company, Platoons and Squads, FM 7-10, (Washington: Government Printing Office, April, 1970).

Periodicals

Brower, Kenneth S. "Armor in the October War," ARMOR, LXXXIII No. 3 (May-June, 1974).

Caine, Bruce T., "Dragoon and Hussars: Tomorrow's Maneuver Battalions," ARMOR, LXXXIII, No. 6 (November-December, 1974).

Camby, Steven, "The Alliance and Europe: Part IV Military Doctrine and Technology," Adelphi Paper, No. 109, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

Davidson, Michael S. "U. S. Army Europe: Ready, Disciplined, Professional," ARMY, Vol. 24, No. 10, (October, 1974).

DePuy, William E. "Successful Army Needs Top Training," ARMY, Vol. 24, No. 10 (October, 1974).

Dials, George E., and Dick Larsen, "NATO: Two Views," ARMY, Vol. 25, No. 2, (February, 1975).

Komer, R. W., "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound," Military Review, LIV, No. 8 (August, 1974).

Ledbetter, Homer M., "Armored Assault Across Europe: Can It Be Stopped?," ARMOR, LXXXIII No. 5 (September-October, 1974).

Mace, James E., "The Combined Arms Battalion, Reality or Myth," ARMOR, LXXXIII No. 4 (July-August, 1974).

Milner, Clive, "The Combat Team Commander," ARMOR, LXXXIII No. 3 (May-June, 1974).

Nagengast, Paul F., and Mack B. Gardner, "3 for 5," ARMOR, LXXXIII No. 1 (January-February, 1974).

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M., "Infantry's Combat Vehicles," ARMOR, LXXXIII No. 5 (September-October, 1974).

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M., "Mechanized Infantry," Military Review, LIV, No. 8 (August, 1974).

Ogorkiewicz, Richard M. "Tanks in Tomorrow's Armies," Military Review, LIV, No. 2 (February, 1974).

Salvan, Jean G., "French Infantry," INFANTRY, Vol. 64 No. 5 (September-October, 1974).

Other

Campbell, William G., Form and Style in Thesis Writing. 3d ed. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company., 1969.

Davidson, Michael S., GEN, USA, "Combined Arms Training in USAREUR and 7A," Disposition form from DTAC, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College (21 January, 1975).

Speech by GEN William E. DePuy to Infantry Officers Advanced Courses at U. S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, 13 February 1975.

Support material from Fourth Mechanized Division, Ft. Carson, Colorado, "Battalion Task Force Test Program". May- August, 1974.